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Punishment and Blame for Culpable
Indifference
KENNETH W. SIMONS
Boston University School of Law, USA
(Received 5 June 2013; accepted 20 February 2014)
ABSTRACT In criminal law, the mental state of the defendant is a crucial determinant
of the grade of crime that the defendant has committed and of whether the conduct is
criminal at all. Under the widely accepted modern hierarchy of mental states, an actor
is most culpable for causing harm purposely and progressively less culpable for doing
so knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Notably, this hierarchy emphasizes cognitive
rather than conative mental states. But this emphasis, I argue, is often unjustified. When
we punish and blame for wrongful acts, we should look beyond the cognitive dimen-
sions of the actor’s culpability and should consider affective and volitional dimensions
as well, including the actor’s intentions, motives, and attitudes. One promising alterna-
tive mental state is the attitude of culpable indifference. However, we must proceed
carefully when permitting criminal liability to turn on culpable indifference and similar
attitudes, lest we punish vicious or unvirtuous feelings that are not sufficiently con-
nected to wrongful acts, and lest we punish disproportionately for attitudes that reflect
only a very modest degree of culpability.
I. Introduction
In criminal law, the ‘mental state’1 of the defendant is a crucial determinant of
the grade of crime that the defendant has committed. Sometimes, it also deter-
mines whether the defendant’s conduct is criminal.
Correspondence Address: Kenneth W. Simons, Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison
Distinguished Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law, Boston, MA 02215, USA. Email:
ksimons@bu.edu
1I use quotation marks because criminal law codes standardly classify negligence as a mental state
for these purposes, yet negligence is often defined to include grossly deficient conduct or skill. Per-
haps it is more accurate to speak, not of ‘mental state’ requirements, but of ‘culpability require-
ments other than the voluntary act requirement and the lack of justification or excuse’.
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
Inquiry, 2015
Vol. 58, No. 2, 143–167, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2015.986853
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A common hierarchy of mental states, in order of decreasing culpability, is
the following:
(1) Purpose to cause a harm.
(2) Knowledge (or belief2) that one will, or that one is very likely to, cause
a harm.
(3) Recklessness, i.e. belief that there is a substantial risk that one will
cause a harm.
(4) Negligence, i.e. where one should be aware of a substantial risk that
one will cause a harm.3
This hierarchy describes mental states as applied to result elements, such as
causing a death in the crime of homicide. Purposely or knowingly causing a
death is typically categorized as murder, recklessly causing a death is often cat-
egorized as involuntary manslaughter, and negligently causing a death as negli-
gent homicide. A similar hierarchy describes mental states as applied to
circumstance elements, such as whether the defendant’s sexual partner does not
consent, or whether the defendant has violated a prohibition on engaging in
conduct with an underage person (such as selling alcohol to a person under the
age of 21), or whether the goods that defendant possesses are in fact stolen.
Thus, one can purposely possess stolen property, knowingly do so, recklessly
do so, or negligently do so. Although grading punishment according to mental
state is much less common with respect to circumstance elements of offenses
than with respect to result elements, the hierarchy nevertheless is important,
because it can affect the minimal culpability that a legislature or court selects
for criminalization. Even if sexual offenses are not graded according to mental
state, for example, it is an important question of policy and principle whether
the prosecution must prove the actor’s purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or
instead negligence with respect to the victim’s nonconsent.
One notable feature of this hierarchy is its emphasis on cognitive rather than
conative mental states. With the exception of purpose, all of the relevant men-
tal states make essential reference to the actor’s beliefs (or, in the case of negli-
gence, to what the actor should have believed). The point of imposing criminal
liability on those who cause harm that they believed was very likely to occur
(or that they believed had a substantial chance of occurring) is not, of course,
simply to punish actors who have acquired such beliefs. Rather, it is to punish
2‘Knowingly’ is the term most often used in criminal statutes, but the relevant mental state is actu-
ally belief. ‘Knowingly’ is simply a convenient shorthand for two requirements—the mental state
of belief, and the truth of the matter believed. If a statute requires knowledge that a victim of sex-
ual assault does not consent, then the state must prove both that defendant believed the victim did
not consent and that the victim actually did not consent.
3This hierarchy is most carefully articulated in the Model Penal Code, which has been influential in
American criminal law. See Model Penal Code §2.02(2). I have simplified its definitions in the
text.
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them (a) for not taking proper account of those beliefs in acting and (b) in
proportion to the fault that (a) reveals. On the standard view, proceeding to act
despite awareness of a highly probable risk of harm is ordinarily highly
culpable and deserving of significant punishment. Proceeding to act despite
awareness of a substantial but not highly probable risk of harm is also culpa-
ble, but, ceteris paribus, deserves lesser punishment. So if I ride my bicycle at
very high speed on a path shared with pedestrians, I am more culpable for
choosing to maintain my speed despite recognizing a very high risk of
colliding with a pedestrian, than for choosing to maintain my speed despite
recognizing a much smaller risk of collision.
This modern hierarchy of mental states has much to commend it. The dis-
tinction between purpose and knowledge is virtually identical to the distinction
drawn by the doctrine of double effect (DDE), between harms that one intends
(either as a means or end) and harms that one merely foresees as a side effect.4
In some criminal law contexts, including attempt, accomplice liability, and trea-
son, the distinction is often critical, because purpose rather than knowledge is
often the mental state required for conviction. And the distinction between
recklessness and negligence is often sensible: knowingly taking a substantial
risk of killing or injuring someone is usually more culpable than inadvertently
creating the same risk of causing someone’s death or injury.
However, I want to focus on two problems that the hierarchy raises. First, is
the value of the cognitive distinctions overstated, especially the distinction
between knowledge and recklessness? Second, is the cognitive focus incom-
plete? Should conative features play a larger role? An affirmative answer to
this question brings us to the central focus of this paper: can the mental state
of ‘culpable indifference’ address the deficiencies of the standard hierarchy?
How should that mental state be defined? How should its use be limited? In a
final section of the paper, I will briefly address how this analysis of indiffer-
ence might, and might not, apply in the nonlegal domain of moral blame.
This paper largely assumes a nonconsequentialist perspective. Mens rea dis-
tinctions are generally more important in deontological theories, where they
have intrinsic significance, than in consequentialist theories, where their rele-
vance is merely contingent.5 The paper focuses on conduct that is otherwise
4It is not entirely clear whether DDE presupposes a contrast between (1) purposely causing a harm
and (2a) what criminal law would cause knowing causation of the side effect, or merely (2b) what
criminal law would call the reckless causation of that side effect (which the actor foresees as a pos-
sible but not high risk). It is also unclear whether DDE is meant to apply, not just to the distinction
between purposely and knowingly causing harms as side effects, but also to the distinction between
engaging in conduct for the purpose of satisfying a relevant circumstance, and acting with the
knowledge that one will thereby satisfy that circumstance. For example, does DDE make it more
difficult to justify, or does it judge more harshly, (1) purchasing stolen goods when one’s desire or
purpose is that the goods be stolen, rather than merely (2) purchasing stolen goods which one
knows or suspects are stolen?
5See Finkelstein, ‘The Inefficiency of Mens Rea’; and Simons, ‘Rethinking Mental States’.
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impermissible or unjustifiable and then evaluates some of the considerations
that determine the degree of the actor’s culpability for that wrong. However,
mental state criteria are sometimes also relevant in law and morality to
justifiability, an issue I largely put aside for present purposes.
II. Questioning the Emphasis on Cognitive Mental States
An actor’s beliefs about the harm he will or might cause, or about the circumstan-
tial features of his conduct that make his act wrongful or harmful, are certainly
highly relevant to how blameworthy he is. But they cannot be the whole story.
First, beliefs, considered in isolation, say nothing about blameworthiness.
They matter for criminal law only insofar as the actor could and should have
acted differently in light of them. Perhaps I know that my neighbor plans to
steal a smartphone tomorrow. Perhaps I know that I have a strong desire to
steal a smartphone a week from now. Neither belief is, by itself, the proper
foundation of criminal liability, if (as is quite plausible) we are not justified in
imposing significant duties to prevent crimes by others and not justified in
imposing attempt liability on those who have taken no steps toward the com-
pleted crime. Or suppose I discover, after I have faultlessly pulled my car out
of the driveway late at night, that a drunken neighbor was lying underneath
my car, and my car crushed him to death. My ex post knowledge obviously
has no bearing on my criminal liability.
Second, acting unjustifiably in the face of clear knowledge of the risks of
my activity, while culpable, is not always more culpable than acting unjustifi-
ably in the face of lesser (or no) knowledge of those risks. Suppose product
manufacturer A conducts a thorough cost-benefit analysis of the safety benefits
and risks of a particular design, and realizes that the design poses significant
risks, but makes an erroneous judgment, based on a misunderstanding of the
data, that the benefits slightly outweigh those risks. Compare manufacturer B,
which does not even bother researching the safety risks because it wishes to
rush the product to market.6 Similarly, suppose C actually recognizes a small
risk that his sexual partner is not consenting but misreads the cues as signaling
consent because of his sexual inexperience. C might be less culpable than D, a
supremely selfish person who is completely oblivious to the obvious signs that
his sexual partner is frightened of his advances because he is concentrating
entirely on his own sexual satisfaction.
Third, when a person’s activities are widespread, either temporally or spa-
tially, she will often be aware, as a statistical matter, of a virtual certainty that
her conduct will cause harm. But that is hardly enough to judge her conduct as
presumptively wrongful, much less as seriously wrongful. I should not be
guilty of knowingly destroying the property of another simply because I
6See Simons, ‘Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed’; and Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law,
315.
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choose, over my lifetime, to drive 700,000 miles by automobile and thus can
predict at least one faultless accident causing such harm. Wal-Mart should not
be guilty of knowingly hiring undocumented workers simply because, given its
scale, and apart from how vigorously it screens its employees, it knows to a
statistical certainty that thousands of its workers are undocumented.7
Fourth, although the distinction between knowingly and recklessly causing
harm sometimes should make a legal and moral difference, often that distinc-
tion is swamped by other features relevant to culpability. In a fascinating recent
article, Francis Shen and his coauthors report a careful empirical examination
of whether ordinary people are able to understand and apply the Model Penal
Code’s hierarchical culpability structure (purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence).8 They discover that when subjects were asked to sort concrete fac-
tual scenarios into one of these categories and also to assign a level of punish-
ment for each scenario, subjects were able to accurately and reliably
distinguish between purposeful and knowing, between reckless and negligent,
and between negligent and blameless. However, subjects were quite incapable
of distinguishing reliably between knowing and reckless. Although the reasons
for this failure are unclear, one explanation is as follows: ordinary citizens do
not see why a mere increase in the level of risk that a defendant believes he is
creating should be a decisive factor in judging the defendant’s culpability (not-
withstanding the views to the contrary of the Model Penal Code drafters and
the many legislatures that have adopted the hierarchy).9
The discovery that ordinary citizens have enormous difficulty drawing the
distinction between knowledge and recklessness is sobering. But in one
respect, the discovery is not so surprising. For, as we shall see in the next sec-
tion, several legal doctrines explicitly recognize the inadequacy of the simple
knowledge/recklessness distinction.
Fifth, a cognitive emphasis is easier to justify under a choice-based retribu-
tive account than under a character-based account. Although much ink has
been spilled on the question of which account is preferable, and which particu-
lar version of the account is most satisfactory,10 here I will simply note some
concerns about using either account to the exclusion of the other. Choice-based
accounts tend to emphasize the cognitive dimensions of culpability, while
character-based accounts emphasize other dimensions, especially the conative,
7For an extensive discussion of this problem, suggesting that statistical knowledge should not be
judged as presumptively unjustifiable or wrongful except in limited circumstances (e.g. when the
actor knowingly imposes a high, concentrated risk of serious harm on another), see Simons, ‘Statis-
tical Knowledge Deconstructed’.
8Shen et al., ‘Sorting Guilty Minds’.
9I am currently working with several of the authors of this study on follow-up studies to investigate
more carefully the reasons why subjects did not distinguish knowledge and recklessness, and also
to investigate subjects’ reactions to some of the culpable indifference categories discussed in this
paper.
10See, e.g. Duff, ‘Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability’.
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volitional, and affective. Yet neither account is plausible, either as an interpre-
tation or justification of legal doctrine, if it entirely ignores the other dimen-
sions.
Thus, a choice-based account that purports to focus only on what the actor
knew about the risks and other relevant characteristics of his conduct at the
time of his criminal act cannot sensibly restrict itself to identifying the beliefs
that the actor possessed at that time (in light of which he should have acted
differently). Beyond this, it must make controversial normative judgments
about what efforts the actor must make to acquire knowledge, to retain or bring
to current awareness knowledge that she acquired earlier or to which she has
latent access, or to infer danger from facts of which she is quite aware. Such
an account also must, to be plausible, give some consideration to such subtle
factors as the actor’s opportunity for reflection, the firmness of his beliefs and
intentions, and his capacity for resisting emotional pressures in the situation.11
At the same time, a character-based account focused entirely on whether the
actor’s conduct failed to conform to what a person of good character would do
or feel is woefully deficient both in interpreting and justifying legal mental
state categories. For example, how are we to make sense of degrees of culpa-
bility on such an account? To be sure, criteria of negligence are often articu-
lated in this manner: ordinary negligence is a failure to comply with the
standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise; gross negligence
requires a large deviation from that standard. But is intentional killing really
best understood simply as an ‘extraordinarily gross deviation’ from the stan-
dard of care that a virtuous or reasonable person would exercise? Moreover, a
long-standing objection to character theories of criminal culpability is their
dubious guidance for how we should treat ‘out-of-character’ acts.12 X might
have been a paragon of virtue until the day of the killing, but if he loses his
temper and unjustifiably kills V that spotless record has no obvious bearing on
the punishment he justly deserves. Y might have been insufferably callous and
mean-spirited until the day of the killing, but this has no obvious bearing on
whether his conduct on that day was unjustifiable or on how unjustifiable or
culpable it was. To be sure, the fact that conduct flows from a settled, ‘vicious’
character trait might sometimes have significance. If the trait is one that the
11Defensive doctrines of duress and provocation cannot be explained without reference to this last
factor. See Duff, ‘Criminal Responsibility’.
12Similarly, within virtue theory, Tom Hurka has argued that the primary locus of virtue is occur-
rent desires, actions, and feelings, apart from their connection to more stable dispositions and traits:
Imagine that, walking down the street, you see someone kick a dog from an evi-
dent desire to hurt the dog just for the pleasure of doing so. Do you say, ‘That
was a vicious act’ or ‘That was a vicious act on condition that it issued from a
stable disposition to give similar kicks in similar circumstances’? Surely you say
the former.
Hurka, ‘Virtuous Act, Virtuous Disposition’, 71.
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actor cannot be fully blamed for acquiring (suppose he is the 16-year-old son
of white supremacists), the fact that the trait is settled and difficult to change
might have exculpatory significance. If it is one for which he is more responsi-
ble (suppose he has spent years carefully training to be a cold-hearted contract
killer), it might inculpate. But the story to be told must be more nuanced than
simply whether the act flows from a vice of character.
III. Supplementing Cognitive Mental States
Notwithstanding the cognitive emphasis of modern mental state hierarchies,
several legal doctrines broaden the focus. This section identifies three. The first
two treat some instances of recklessness as legally equivalent to knowledge.
The third treats some instances of negligence as legally equivalent to reckless-
ness. These doctrines together underscore the inadequacy of the modern hierar-
chy. But the doctrines pose problems of their own, which will be discussed in
the subsequent section.
A. Depraved heart murder
Consider this example:
Torturer:
D1 subjects V to physical beating and torture, for his own malicious grati-
fication. D1 realizes that he is endangering V’s life, but his plan is to keep
V alive in order to prolong his own pleasure. V dies from the abuse.
Notice that D1 does not count as a murderer under the simple hierarchy,
because he lacks the purpose to kill his victim and also lacks knowledge that
his acts are practically certain to kill the victim. If we were to apply the hierar-
chy, he would be guilty only of reckless manslaughter, not murder. But he cer-
tainly seems highly culpable and at least as culpable as many purposeful or
knowing killers.
One widely recognized category of murder in American jurisdictions is
‘depraved heart’ or ‘extreme indifference’ murder,13 which is meant to capture
13Here is an explanation of the concept from a leading American case:
When an individual commits an act of gross recklessness for which he must rea-
sonably anticipate that death to another is likely to result, he exhibits that ‘wick-
edness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences,
and a mind regardless of social duty’ which proved that there was at that time in
him ‘the state or frame of mind termed malice’.
Commonwealth v. Malone.
Culpable Indifference 149
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [7
6.2
4.9
8.1
80
] a
t 0
5:4
2 2
5 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
cases such as this, as well as cases in which an actor deliberately shoots a gun
into an occupied car or into an occupied house, or in which an actor plays
Russian Roulette with another. This category is essentially a subcategory of
reckless killings in which the actor seems as culpable as a knowing or purpose-
ful killer.14
B. Willful blindness as constructive knowledge
Suspicious smuggler:
S hands D2 a locked box, together with the key, and asks D2 to transport
the box to a friend of S’s in another city, for $200. S does not tell D2
what is in the box, but D2 knows that S is a marijuana dealer. D2 trans-
ports the box without examining its contents. The box in fact contains
marijuana.
In this case, the state might not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that D2 ‘knows’ that he is transporting marijuana, since knowledge often
requires awareness of a very high probability that the legally relevant circum-
stance obtains. Drug offenses typically require knowledge, not merely reckless-
ness (i.e. not merely awareness of a substantial risk that the circumstance
obtains).
However, many courts interpret statutory knowledge requirements broadly,
to encompass cases of ‘willful blindness’, i.e. cases where the D2 is suspicious
that the relevant circumstance obtains but deliberately avoids easy, further
inquiry that would confirm his knowledge. This category is essentially a sub-
category of recklessness as to a circumstance in which the reason why the
actor fails to possess the state of mind of knowledge is especially culpable.
C. Intoxication as constructive recklessness
Drunk driver:
D3 has five beers at a party, knowing that he will be driving home. Because
of his intoxication, he has trouble focusing on the road and fails to see a
pedestrian in the path of his car. He runs over and kills the pedestrian.
14Some European legal systems, especially Germany and the Netherlands, recognize a somewhat
similar concept, dolus eventualis. This, too, is a subcategory of reckless actors, embracing those
who ‘accept’ the risk of the harmful side effects of their conduct and thus should be punished at a
level comparable to purposeful (dolus directus) or knowing (dolus indirectus) actors. ‘Acceptance’
is a notoriously vague and controversial criterion. For a recent account of the controversy, see
Blomsma, Mens Rea, 99–133.
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The state might not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D3 was
consciously aware of a significant risk that he would kill the pedestrian, since
he never perceived the pedestrian in his field of vision.15 Thus, absent a special
rule, it might not be able to convict him of reckless manslaughter, and instead
might be limited to a conviction of negligent homicide or a comparable crime,
with a significantly lower penalty.
However, almost all courts expand the definition of recklessness, to encom-
pass cases where the actor, due to voluntary intoxication, is unaware of a
specific risk of harm that he is posing.16 This category is essentially a
subcategory of negligence cases in which the actor has an especially culpable
reason—voluntary intoxication—for being unaware of the significant risk of
harm that his conduct poses.17
IV. A Closer Look at Culpable Indifference as a Legal Category
A. The meaning of indifference
These supplementary categories have this in common: they expand criminal
liability beyond the conventional modern (and mostly cognitive) hierarchy. But
the first two categories also have in common some problematic features: their
contours are vague, and they could result in dramatic increases in punishment
and could apply in a very wide range of circumstances. These concerns about
inconsistent application and lack of fair notice suggest the need for caution in
the use of these categories. But, more fundamentally, the principle underlying
the categories is not exactly pellucid. I will focus here on this fundamental
question.18
Consider again depraved heart murder. The Model Penal Code, whose other
definitions of mental state categories are relatively precise, and much more
15One significant uncertainty is how to interpret the requirement of ‘conscious awareness of a sub-
stantial risk of death’. If it includes generalized awareness of diffuse future risks, then D3 might
satisfy the requirement, because he probably recognizes that driving drunk creates a significantly
increased risk of running over unseen pedestrians. But this broad interpretation is dubious, because
it threatens to eviscerate the distinction between recklessness and negligence. Virtually all cases of
negligent driving involve ‘awareness of risk’ in this weak and diffuse sense. For example, most
drivers know that if they get distracted by a cellphone call, by an angry comment from a passenger,
or by the need to fiddle with the car’s controls, they will create an increased risk of harm to others.
16See, e.g. Model Penal Code §2.08(2).
17Negligence itself might (at least in its aggravated forms) be analyzed as a species of culpable
indifference. For discussion, see Baron, ‘The Standard of the Reasonable Person’; Simons, ‘Culpa-
bility and Retributive Theory’; and Simons, ‘Dimensions of Negligence’.
18For analysis of the vagueness and scope problems, see Simons, ‘Punishment for Culpable
Indifference’.
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precise than traditional criminal law criteria, offers only this as a definition:
homicide constitutes murder ‘when … (a) it is committed purposely or know-
ingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life’.19
What in the world is ‘extreme indifference’? The presence of the modifier
‘extreme’ provides a clue: ‘indifference’ is not here meant in the sense of equi-
poise or lack of preference or desire. If I am indifferent whether we watch tele-
vision or go for a walk, or whether Romney or Obama is elected, I am in a
state of attitudinal equipoise. But equipoise exists or it does not; it cannot be
‘extreme’ rather than, say, ‘mild’.
Rather, in this context, ‘indifference’ refers to an attitude towards causing a
harm or wrong, an attitude that is to be contrasted with purpose. D might act
with the purpose of causing V harm, but he also might act with indifference to
that result, meaning, very roughly, that, although D did not desire the result, he
cared very little about whether he caused that result, or he cared less than he
should have. Acting with concern or care about the rights and welfare of others
is something that can come in degrees. So an actor might be ‘extremely indif-
ferent’ if, say, she gives very little weight to a very serious wrong or harm in
her practical reasoning, while another might be ‘mildly indifferent’ if he gives
substantial weight to the interests of others, but somewhat less than he should.
The term ‘culpable indifference’ might be preferable to ‘indifference’ or even
‘mild’ vs. ‘extreme indifference’ because it better conveys what the relevant
kind of culpability is—not a state of attitudinal equipoise, but a lack of proper
concern for the rights and interests of others.
To be sure, indifference has other senses. One ordinary language meaning is
emotional insensitivity or callousness, a lack of feeling or affect. But this
meaning is largely irrelevant in the criminal law,20 because the focus of legal
mental state criteria is properly on whether the defendant acted unjustifiably,
and on how blameworthy his conduct was, not on how or what he felt (or on
what he did not feel) about what he was doing. Criminal law should punish
for culpable acts and choices (and for omissions when one has a duty to act),
not for objectionable or deficient desires, attitudes, beliefs, intentions, or feel-
ings that are unconnected to acts.
19Model Penal Code §210.2 (1) (a), (b). The definition does add language presuming extreme indif-
ference when the actor causes death in the course of committing certain serious felonies.
20Largely but not entirely irrelevant: in evaluating whether a defendant is legally insane, it might
be relevant whether the defendant has both affective and cognitive capacities to know that his con-
duct is wrong. But once the defendant satisfies these minimum capacities, it does not seem relevant
to the degree of his deserved punishment whether he displayed enormous empathy, little empathy,
or no empathy when he engaged in an action that harmed or endangered another. The (mostly)
unfeeling Mr Spock of Star Trek fame is not for that reason deserving of greater criminal punish-
ment for otherwise unjustified conduct.
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B. Disconnected attitudes: remorse, hope, and cruelty
To underscore this point, consider three legal contexts in which the attitude of
the actor towards the criminal wrong or harm might not be sufficiently con-
nected to his commission of the wrong or causation of harm and therefore
might not justly bear on his criminal punishment: (1) an actor’s remorse (or
lack of remorse) for a past wrong; (2) his hope (rather than intention) that a
wrong will occur; and (3) the actor’s cruelty.
First, does it count against a finding of ‘extreme indifference’ murder that
the defendant, after killing the victim, felt enormous remorse? Does it count in
favor that he felt no remorse, or was even delighted that he caused a death?
The answer in both cases should be No.21 The question for criminal law
should be whether the actor’s attitude influenced the fact or the manner of the
killing, not whether it demonstrates his good or bad character in responding to
the killing. Perhaps the presence of remorse has a modest bearing on his
proper sentence for other retributive or consequentialist reasons—e.g. because
the defendant who shows remorse has accepted responsibility for his wrong
and deserves some credit on his retributive ‘ledger’.22 But an actor’s post-act
remorse is entirely consistent with the judgment that when he committed the
criminal act itself, he was ‘indifferent’ in the sense relevant to the criminal
law. Similarly, the actor’s ex post-pleasure in the harm he has caused does
not, by itself, demonstrate (or even enhance) his culpability for causing the
harm.
Second, criminal law criteria occasionally make guilt depend on whether the
actor ‘hopes’ that a legally relevant circumstance exists.23 For example, under
the Model Penal Code, if it is a crime to purposely receive stolen property,
then one may commit the crime either by receiving property that one believes
is stolen, or by receiving property that one ‘hopes’ is stolen (even if, in the lat-
ter case, one believes that it is not stolen).24 Suppose acting with ‘hope’ is
21See People v. Roe, in which the dissent argues that defendant’s remorse after fatally wounding
the victim in a Russian Roulette game undercut a finding of extreme indifference; the majority
properly rejects the argument.
22The act of expressing remorse might also, to some extent, mitigate the emotional harm suffered
by surviving members of the victim’s family and other members of the community, and thus can
properly be considered at sentencing. And a motive of remorse is also properly considered in deter-
mining whether an actor who has committed an attempt is entitled to a complete defense of aban-
donment of the attempt.
23For further discussion, see Simons, ‘Punishment for “Culpable Indifference”’ 237–9. Although
‘hope’ is found in a number of criminal statutes, I have found no actual cases in which criminal
liability was imposed because the actor hoped that x (even though the actor did not believe that x).
24Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(a)(ii): ‘A person acts purposely with respect to [the attendant circum-
stances of a crime if] he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or if he believes or hopes
that they exist.’
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understood in one of its ordinary language senses, as a desire for a state of
affairs that the actor need not have any power to effectuate. By contrast, acting
with the ‘intention’ of satisfying a state of affairs does presuppose some power
to effectuate that state. Thus understood, hope is a problematic basis for
criminal liability. Consider an example. Jones buys property from Smith for a
particular price, and she hopes it is stolen, because she will thereby impress
her radical friends with her anarchist values. However, she believes the prop-
erty is almost certainly not stolen, and its stolen quality plays no role in her
decision to purchase or in the price she pays. Jones exhibits a reprehensible
attitude, but why should that matter, if the attitude played no role whatsoever
in her choices and actions? If ‘hope’ is indeed a permissible basis for greater
punishment, the implications are troubling. Should we punish a reckless driver
more severely because he hoped that the victim would die, even if that desire
played no role in how dangerously he drove? (Of course, if that desire did play
such a role—for example, if the driver swerved as close as possible to the
victim in order to harm the victim, or in order to increase the risk of an injury
—then the driver’s attitude is indeed sufficiently connected to his action that it
may justly bear on the driver’s sentence.) And conversely, the mere fact that
an actor hopes that harm will not befall a victim is not relevant to his just
punishment, if that benign wish was irrelevant to the actor’s choices and
conduct.25
Third, consider the relevance of ‘cruelty’ to criminal liability. In states that
impose the death penalty, a very common aggravating circumstance that helps
support that penalty is that the murder was ‘especially heinous, atrocious, and
cruel’. Moreover, some states include cruelty as one factor supporting a finding
of first-degree murder. For example, Massachusetts defines first-degree murder
as ‘Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or
with extreme atrocity or cruelty …’26
What is cruelty, for legal purposes? The authorized jury instruction for mur-
der in Massachusetts states:
Extreme cruelty means that the defendant caused the person’s death by a
method that surpassed the cruelty inherent in any taking of a human life.
… You must determine whether the method or mode of a killing is so
shocking as to amount to murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty. The
inquiry focuses on the defendant’s action in terms of the manner and
means of inflicting death, and on the resulting effect on the victim.
25See Ferzan, ‘Don’t Abandon the Model Penal Code’, 203.
26Mass. Gen. L. Ann. 265 §1.
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The jury also is told to consider a range of specific factors, including, notably,
‘whether the defendant was indifferent to or took pleasure in the suffering of
the deceased’.27
But is it justifiable to consider this last factor in determining the defendant’s
criminal punishment? The practical stakes are great: classifying a case as first-
degree murder can mean the difference between mandatory life imprisonment
and a much shorter prison term. In some cases, considering this factor seems
entirely appropriate. Suppose C1 killed the victim in a particularly brutal man-
ner for the very purpose of obtaining pleasure in the victim’s suffering. That
form of cruelty reflects an especially reprehensible motive. But imagine a dif-
ferent case. Suppose C2 kills his victim in a brutal manner and discovers, to
his surprise, that this brings him great pleasure. We might even suppose that
C2 has killed before and has never before derived any emotional satisfaction
from the killing. Should C2’s pleasure count in favor of imposing a much hea-
vier punishment? Even if C2’s violent actions are no different than what they
would have been had C2 not obtained such pleasure?28 (The jury instruction,
read literally, suggests an affirmative answer.)
Whether the concept of ‘cruelty’ does or should extend to cases such as C2 is
uncertain. One source of the uncertainty is that cruelty might refer simply to
engaging in particular types of acts, such as acts that cause gratuitous suffering,
apart from the improper motives or inapt pleasures of the actor. A five year old
who pulls the wings off a fly is cruel in this minimal sense simply because her
act causes pointless suffering, even if she does not know that it does, and even
if she does not act for that purpose. But if cruelty also has an attitudinal compo-
nent, does it require a vicious or sadistic motive as in C1, or is it also satisfied
whenever the actor obtains pleasure in consequence of another’s pain, as in C2?
27The full list of factors that the jury is to consider is as follows:
In deciding whether the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant caused the death of the deceased with extreme atrocity or cru-
elty, you must consider the presence and degree of the following factors: One:
whether the defendant was indifferent to or took pleasure in the suffering of the
deceased; Two: the consciousness and degree of suffering of the deceased; Three:
the extent of the injuries to the deceased; Four: the number of blows delivered;
Five: the manner, degree and severity of the force used; Six: the nature of the
weapon, instrument or method used; Seven: the disproportion between the means
needed to cause death and those employed. This seventh factor refers to whether
the means used were excessive and out of proportion to what would be needed to
kill a person.
Mass. Superior Court Jury Instructions §2.5.2 (Murder with Extreme Atrocity or Cruelty).
28If C2 suddenly discovers that a brutal method of killing brings him pleasure, but then continues
to employ that method in the course of attacking the victim for the purpose of prolonging the plea-
sure, C2’s motives are quite similar to C1’s, and it is then clearly appropriate to consider his cruel
motive in determining his punishment.
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Whatever the answer to this question, which is a question about the moral
concept of cruelty,29 we should have serious qualms about imposing extra
criminal punishment on C2 because of his emotional reaction. Thus, contrast
C2 with C3, who does not actually cause suffering to others, but who takes
pleasure in another causing such suffering. (Suppose C3 enjoys watching a
video clip of someone violently attacking another.) It seems accurate to
describe C3 as possessing a cruel attitude, parasitic on an actual act of cruelty.
But C3 is not properly subject to criminal punishment.30 So is there any reason
that C2 is properly subject to greater punishment because of his own cruel
attitude?
Here is one possible reason. When C2 realizes that he is deriving pleasure
from his attack on the victim, he can do something: stop the attack or stop
himself from feeling that pleasure. He is not simply a passive bystander to his
own vicious reactions. In this respect, he is like an actor R who shouts racist
slurs while attacking a victim; even if the racial identity of the victim played
no role in R’s decision to attack or in his method of attack, his failure to con-
trol his racist impulses reflects some degree of culpability. Still, it is doubtful
that this argument adequately justifies the enormous punishment difference that
the ‘pleasure in another’s suffering’ factor legally permits.
I raise these questions without fully resolving them. The discussion does
show that if we wish to limit the state’s role to punishing for acts, not for
vicious attitudes or character traits, we need to proceed very cautiously in per-
mitting consideration of such attitudinal factors as remorse, hope, and cruelty.
C. Other possible meanings of indifference
Even if we restrict ‘culpable indifference’ to attitudes that are appropriately
expressed in, or that causally contribute to, action, we need to examine more
closely which attitudes so qualify. I will suggest that a pluralistic account is
most defensible.
However, we should resist two other possible interpretations of ‘culpable
indifference’ that have some currency but are inadequate. On one interpreta-
tion, culpable indifference is just a term of art for all culpable states of mind.31
Viewed this way, murder requires causing a death with, say, ‘extraordinary’ or
‘extreme’ culpable indifference, a term that encompasses causing a death pur-
posely, knowingly, and also in other highly culpable ways or for other highly
29That moral concept might include not only delight or pleasure in inflicting suffering on others,
but also indifference to that suffering. See Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, 95–6.
30However, perhaps C3’s contributing to the market for violent videos deserves punishment because
it increases the risk that the violent acts depicted in the videos will occur.
31See Alexander, Ferzan, and Morse, Crime and Culpability, occasionally endorsing this interpreta-
tion: ‘insufficient concern’ is the term of art that they employ. For a critique, see Simons, ‘Book
Review: Retributivism Refined’, 566–8.
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culpable reasons. This interpretation has little to commend it, for it leaves open
the content of the third, residual category, and it simply stipulates rather than
explains why these different states of mind ought to be treated the same for
purposes of deserved punishment.
A second interpretation is more promising: perhaps causing harm with ‘cul-
pable indifference’ is properly punished about as harshly as purposely or
knowingly causing harm because in all three cases, the actor displays the same
moral defect. As the commentary to the Model Penal Code’s extreme indiffer-
ence murder provision suggests as follows:
In a prosecution for murder … the Code calls for the … judgment
whether the actor’s conscious disregard of the risk, under the circum-
stances, manifests extreme indifference to the value of human life. The
significance of purpose or knowledge as a standard of liability is that,
cases of provocation or other mitigation aside, purposeful or knowing
homicide demonstrates precisely such indifference to the value of human
life.32
But the initial attraction of this argument fades upon analysis. What is the ‘pre-
cise’ quality of moral indifference shared by all three kinds of murder? One
who purposely kills another personally commits himself, via his means and
ends, to bring about a serious harm and wrong. Normally this amounts to an
especially culpable personal identification with evil.33 Knowingly (but not pur-
posely) killing does not have these features. However, it usually does demon-
strate a severe discounting of the rights of others relative to a socially
acceptable valuation and, for this distinct reason, is especially culpable.34 And
similarly, recklessly (but not knowingly) killing usually demonstrates a serious,
but somewhat less severe, discounting of the rights of others.
In my view, there is a qualitative difference between purposeful harms, on
the one hand, and knowing and reckless harms, on the other. The latter two
categories do evince a similar kind of indifference in the sense of devaluation
of the rights of victims. But, for reasons we have already explored, there is
more to indifference than acting with cognitive awareness of likely or possible
harm.
Consider a telling pair of examples offered by Professor Claire Finkelstein
that illuminate the subtly different ways in which purpose and knowledge bear
32Model Penal Code comment to §210.2.
33See Nagel, The View From Nowhere; and Tadros, The Ends of Harm.
34Notice, too, that one may purposely kill despite believing that one’s chance of success is slight,
e.g. if D shoots at the victim from a considerable distance because that is D’s only chance of any
success. Not all purposeful killings are knowing (whereas all knowing killings are reckless, in the
sense that the knowing actor believes that he is imposing at least a substantial risk of death). This
again underscores the qualitatively difference between the culpability expressed by purposeful kill-
ing and that expressed by knowing killing.
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on an actor’s culpability. Variations on the examples will also shed light on the
way in which recklessness and recklessness plus culpable indifference bear on
culpability. The examples (which I have paraphrased) are unusual ones: the
actor who knowingly causes death arguably displays greater culpability than
the actor who purposely causes death.
Two arsonists:
E1 is the beneficiary of V1’s life insurance policy. She sets fire to her
own house where V1 is sleeping in order to collect. V1 dies in the fire.
E2 has a homeowner’s policy on which she wants to collect and sets fire
to her own house, notwithstanding her knowledge that V2, who is sleep-
ing in the house, will certainly die. Moreover, E2 knows that if she waits
an hour, V2 will have left the house. Nevertheless, E2 burns down the
house now. V2 dies in the fire.
E2 seems more culpable than E1, but this contradicts the usual intuition that
purposefully causing harm displays greater culpability than knowingly doing
so. Here is Finkelstein’s explanation:
The agent who does not have to kill to obtain her end, but does so any-
way in a state of indifference, seems worse than the agent who must kill
and does so in order to accomplish her end. The agent who intends to kill
might place a higher intrinsic value on human life. Her actions are com-
patible with her having deep regret at having to kill to obtain her end.
Agent 2, however, could not plausibly be said to place a high value on
human life. She is indifferent to the prospect of killing, to the point where
she would rather kill than suffer a minor inconvenience.35
But Finkelstein’s analysis, while illuminating, does not undermine the general
distinction between purposely and knowingly causing harm, nor does it demon-
strate that indifference simply amounts to excessive devaluation of the rights of
others. Ceteris paribus, acting with purpose is more culpable than acting with
knowledge. E1 and E2 differ in a number of respects; if we control for those
differences, the significance of the purpose/knowledge distinction becomes
more salient. Thus, suppose two more variations.
E3 is a reckless (or ‘knowing risk’) variation of E2, identical to E2 except
that E3 is aware of a 5% chance (rather than near certainty) that the vic-
tim will die and refuses to wait an hour to reduce that risk to zero.
35Finkelstein, ‘The Inefficiency of Mens Rea’, 340.
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E4 is a purposeful risk variation of E2. E4 is identical to E3 and E2 in
her motive to burn down the house for the homeowner’s insurance
proceeds, in her awareness of a 5% chance that the victim will die, and in
refusing to wait an hour to reduce the risk of harm to the victim to zero.
But E4 differs in this important respect: she endangers the victim pur-
posely rather than knowingly, for the malicious pleasure she derives from
frightening the victim. (She sets the fire in location A rather than location
B because a fire set at A is much more likely to frighten the victim
terribly.)
Because E4 has purposely and not merely knowingly created the risk of death
and has purposely and not merely recklessly frightened the victim, E4 is more
culpable than E3.36
Nevertheless, Finkelstein’s original examples E1 and E2 are instructive. E2
indeed seems to be highly culpable, and more culpable than most other
actors who knowingly cause serious harm or death. Why? Because of the
ease with which E2 could achieve her dominant end, obtaining insurance
money, without causing such harm. More precisely, what is distinctive is the
extraordinary weight E2 gives, not just to the primary end of obtaining finan-
cial gain, but also to the secondary and socially insignificant end of avoiding
the inconvenience of waiting an hour. By contrast, in a knowing harm case
where the only way the actor can achieve his primary end is to knowingly
harm someone as a side effect, his conduct is not gratuitously harmful, so
even if it is unjustified, it lacks that aggravating feature. Thus, suppose a
new character, E2*, must burn the house down now in order to effectively
destroy it; a delay will be fatal (so to speak!) to that end. E2* is less
culpable than E2.37
Let us now extend the analysis to recklessness plus culpable indifference.
From the earlier discussion, we would expect as follows: (a) acting with
knowledge is ordinarily more culpable than acting with recklessness, but (b) a
subcategory of recklessness cases is comparable to knowledge cases—namely
those that contain an aggravating factor of culpable indifference. And so we do
find. As an illustration of (a), notice that E2 is more culpable than E3. For a
plausible instance of (b), consider yet another arsonist, E5. E5 has the same
beliefs and motives as reckless E3 except in one respect: she decides to turn
36In E4, the actor endangers V purposely, but does not act with the purpose of killing V. We can
also construct a contrasting scenario for E1. The fact that E1 regrets having to kill in order to
obtain insurance money still makes her more culpable than an otherwise similarly situated actor
E2* who regrets having to take an action that he knows will cause death, in order to obtain insur-
ance money. Suppose the only time when E2* can set fire to his own house in order to obtain
homeowner’s insurance is when the victim is present.
37The analysis would be similar for new character E3*, who must burn down the house now in
order to effectively destroy it; he is less culpable than E3, even if both actors create the same 5%
risk of death.
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off the video feed in the house that would tell her that the victim will very
likely die in the fire, because she does not want to know. E5’s ‘willful blind-
ness’, her decision to avoid knowledge, perhaps justifies punishing her more
harshly than reckless E3 and as harshly as E2, who knows that the victim is
very likely to perish.
Finkelstein frames the difference between the culpability of E2 and E1 as a
difference in how much each actor intrinsically values human life, with pur-
poseful killer E1, paradoxically, valuing the life of the victim more. This analy-
sis is only partly right. E2’s willingness to sacrifice a life for what E2 herself
would concede to be a trivial interest in very briefly accelerating the timing of
the arson demonstrates an extraordinary level of selfishness and moral deprav-
ity. But we should be wary of treating the difference between the actors as sim-
ply a difference in how much each actor subjectively values the life of another
when the actor reasons practically toward her ends. Such an account is overly
reductive. On such a view, a morally upstanding citizen gives (let us say)
weight 10,000 to the disvalue of causing an innocent person’s death; E1
improperly accorded that result a weight of only 100; and E2 is more culpable
than E1 because he accorded that result an even lesser weight of 10.
As tempting as this form of analysis is, it is incomplete and misleading.
Whether an act is unjustified, and how unjustified and culpable it is, depends
on a variety of factors, of which the actor’s subjective valuation of the rights
and interests of others is only one. Also highly relevant are the permissibility,
nature, and significance of the actor’s goals, the alternatives reasonably avail-
able to him, the facts reasonably accessible to the actor, the actor’s assumed
social role, the relationship and expectations of the parties, and so forth.38
Here, for example, E1’s culpability differs in kind from E2’s, insofar as E1
intentionally structures his conduct towards killing the victim, and commits
himself to that end.
But shouldn’t the subjective valuation that the actor assigns to the rights and
interests of others at least count as a critical factor? in particular in the present
context, when we are evaluating whether a subcategory of reckless acts that
threaten harm demonstrate culpability comparable to acts that purposely or
knowingly cause harm?39 I do agree that analysis would be simpler if this fac-
tor were given controlling weight. The torturer gives much too little weight to
his victim’s continued life. Similarly for the person who shoots into an unoccu-
38Thus, indifference or ‘caring less than one should’ is not a single desire-state. Rather, it expresses
what Holly Smith has called ‘a reprehensible configuration of desires and aversions’: Smith, ‘Cul-
pable Ignorance’, 556. ‘Thus, a concern for one’s own welfare is not bad in itself, nor bad even if
very powerful, so long as it is counterbalanced by sufficiently strong aversions to harming others.’
39Notice that the Model Penal Code’s murder formulation uses the phrase ‘extreme indifference to
the value of human life’. It does not employ a formulation that would be more parallel to purposely
or knowingly causing death (e.g. ‘extreme indifference to whether the actor would cause death’).
This choice of language reveals how natural it is to emphasize deficient valuation when defining
and explaining culpability criteria.
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pied car or home. Alas, culpability is simply not so simple. Recall that the tor-
turer in the earlier example (D1) wanted to keep his victim alive, in order to
prolong the sadistic pleasure he derived from his victim’s pain. Considered in
isolation, the torturer’s valuation of the victim’s life is not as low as in many
other murder cases, yet his acts remain highly culpable. The malevolence and
clear unjustifiability of the torturer’s ends are critical to our judgment that he is
highly culpable; it is hardly decisive that, in a narrow sense, he ‘devalues’ the
life of his victim less than most purposeful or knowing killers do, because he
seeks to keep the victim alive for his nefarious purposes. Moreover, this ‘insuf-
ficient value’ approach rests on a controversial mode of legal and moral analy-
sis that in judging degree of culpability, we must employ a sliding scale,
judging the extent to which the actor deviates from either the result of the scale
or the proper method of employing it. This mode of analysis will be congenial
to many consequentialists, but not to many deontologists and retributivists, for
familiar reasons.
In the end, the judgment that an actor is culpably indifferent to the harm he
might do to another, or to his legal obligations, is a judgment that must depend
on a plurality of features, features that cannot be reduced to ‘deficient valuation
of human life’, or to ‘culpable choice’ or ‘culpable character’. In such concrete
contexts as how to interpret the ‘extreme indifference’ murder category, a plu-
ralistic approach is often employed.40As a matter of principle, such a pluralistic
approach is entirely justifiable.
D. Culpable indifference and the doctrine of double effect (DDE)
The lessons from Finkelstein’s examples and the further variations noted
above shed some light on a familiar philosophical problem: the standard
DDE scenarios of terror bomber (TB) and strategic bomber (SB). Under
DDE, it is much more difficult to justify intentionally causing a harm as a
40Although some courts employ oversimplified criteria for ‘extreme indifference’ murder, in prac-
tice many are sensitive to a range of considerations. Thus, they should, and often do, consider:
• Whether the actor intends to expose another to a risk of harm, either as a
means or as an end (e.g. playing Russian Roulette, or deliberately firing a
weapon at or driving a vehicle towards the victim in order to scare him);
• Whether the actor was motivated or moved by sadism, cruelty, pecuniary gain,
or some other especially culpable, heinous or evil motive or intention;
• Whether the actor’s anger, racism, or other culpable desires or emotions caus-
ally contribute to his conduct;
• Whether the risk of harm arose from the actor’s choice to participate in an
immoral or illegal activity;
• Whether the actor successively created multiple risks over a short period of
time;• As a mitigating factor, whether the actor attempted to avoid or reduce
the risk of harm.
See Simons, ‘Punishment for “Culpable Indifference”’, 307–13.
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means or end, than to justify causing such a harm as a foreseen side effect.41
Suppose the military on the just side of a conflict can prevent the opposing
side from carrying out an imminent plan to destroy a village, killing 1,000
people, only by immediately bombing an enemy camp. Unfortunately, bomb-
ing the camp will kill 20 innocent civilians as a side effect.42 SB might well
be justified in bombing the camp. Contrast a TB scenario: the military can
prevent the imminent destruction of the village and 1,000 deaths only by
sending in TB to deliberately target and kill 20 innocent civilians. The point
of this bombing mission is to terrorize the opposing side; the military strate-
gists know that the mission will cause the enemy to abandon its plan to
destroy the village and its inhabitants.43
DDE tells us that SB might be acting permissibly even though TB is acting
impermissibly. But DDE also tells us that even if a SB acts impermissibly—for
example, because the expected harm to civilians is just large enough to out-
weigh the expected military advantage—he is less culpable than TB.44
Consider a different SB, SB2, who knows that bombing the enemy camp is
likely to kill 200 (rather than 20) innocent civilians and suppose that this
expected harm to civilians is just large enough to outweigh the expected mili-
tary advantage and render the action impermissible. DDE suggests that SB2 is
less culpable than TB2, who, like SB2, knowingly kills 200 innocent civilians,
but, unlike SB2, does so deliberately in order to terrorize the enemy into aban-
doning its plan.
Now compare another variation, SB3, analogous to arsonist E2. Let us fill in
certain details. Suppose SB3, such asSB2, attacks the enemy camp during the
daytime, and he expects 200 children at the adjacent school to die as a side
effect. In SB2’s case, the bombing must be done immediately, or else the
village and its inhabitants will be destroyed by the enemy. In SB3’s case, the
bombing must be done within two hours, because it is known that the enemy
41The DDE literature is voluminous. A recent survey is FitzPatrick, ‘The Doctrine of Double
Effect’. For a recent defense, see Wedgwood, ‘Defending Double Effect’.
42Here I will employ a variation on Victor Tadros’s version, which, helpfully, is more concrete than
usual versions that describe the benefit of strategic bombing only as some vague ‘significant mili-
tary advantage’. Tadros, 204. I have changed the target from a munitions plant to an enemy camp,
and have changed the number of civilian casualties from Tadros’s 100 to 20 to make it more plau-
sible that the knowing killing of the civilians is permissible.
43The standard TB scenarios such as this are highly unrealistic in modern warfare, given the likeli-
hood that such atrocities will be publicized by modern media. Clear evidence that innocent civilians
have been deliberately targeted is probably more likely to stiffen the other side’s resolve than to
bully them into a change of plans. But I will stick with the familiar SB/TB scenarios because of
their prominence in the literature.
44Some view DDE more narrowly, as a principle that distinguishes only between impermissible and
permissible acts (and that places purposeful harms in the impermissible category and knowing
harms in the permissible category, so long as the foreseen harm is ‘proportional’). But on a broader
view, DDE also is relevant to the question of the degree to which the act is unjustifiable or culpa-
ble: acts that purposely cause harm are more unjustifiable or more culpable than acts that know-
ingly cause harm even when the latter acts are impermissible.
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will attack then but no earlier. SB3 knows he could wait an hour until the
children have left the school, without diminishing the probability that his
bombing missions will succeed. But he decides to bomb the school now, in
order to get the bombing run over with sooner (and thus to see more of the
World Cup final). SB3 is clearly more culpable than SB2, just as E2 is clearly
more culpable than E2*.45 And we can imagine more variations along the
same lines.46
One general lesson from this analysis is as follows. DDE, as convention-
ally formulated, only distinguishes between purpose and knowledge (whether
the question at issue is an act’s permissibility or instead concerns its degree
of unjustifiability or of culpability). But if we add the dimension of culpa-
ble indifference, we can identify cases on the ‘knowledge’ (or recklessness)
side of the line that are especially culpable. SB3 is such a case. We can
thus partially blunt the common and well-taken objection that DDE too
readily justifies acts that bring about known but not intended harmful con-
sequences.
V. Some Implications for Moral Blame
These observations about the proper use of legal criteria of culpable indiffer-
ence have some implications for moral blaming practices. Moral philosophers
have devoted much more attention to whether an act is blameworthy, or
whether an actor is morally responsible for an act, than to how blameworthy
the act or actor is. The legal culpability criteria analyzed above can, I believe,
help illuminate this last question.
Insofar as we justifiably blame one another for wrongful conduct, many of
the considerations mentioned above are quite relevant. When criminal wrongs
are also moral wrongs, the analysis above largely applies: you ought to blame
your child, spouse, friend, or neighbor more for purposely causing serious harm
than for knowingly causing such harm, and so forth.47 Of course, the scope of
45Interestingly enough, although (knowing) E2 seems more culpable than (purposeful) E1, (know-
ing) SB3 does not seem more culpable than (purposeful) TB. One reason is that to kill for the pur-
pose of terrorizing a civilian population is to kill for an especially evil motive.
46Thus, suppose SB4 knows he could either bomb location X or location Y in order to prevent the
destruction of the village, but bombing X will get him back to base sooner, yet bombing X will kill
a few more civilians than will bombing Y. Like SB3, SB4 is clearly more culpable than SB2.
47However, blaming practices may differ from punishment practices in the following important
respect. Punishment practices often require hierarchical rankings of the degree of wrong, because
punishment typically is translated into a scalar currency such as amount of a fine or amount of
prison time. By contrast, blaming practices can take the form of more nuanced responses to differ-
ent types of wrongs; there is often no need to translate them into a single currency. One might
respond quite differently to a friend’s intentional lie, for example, than to the friend’s negligent
misstatement; the first moral wrong might deserve reproach and an expression of concern about
whether the trust within the relationship has been irreparably violated, but the second might deserve
immediate forgiveness. I thank Antony Duff for raising this point.
Culpable Indifference 163
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [7
6.2
4.9
8.1
80
] a
t 0
5:4
2 2
5 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
criminal law is limited; it does not address all moral wrongs. If a right or inter-
est is too slight to deserve criminal law protection, or if countervailing reasons
of policy or principle militate against criminalization, we can still ask what
degree of moral blame an actor deserves for violating the right or setting back
the interest. Thus, we could apply much of the analysis above to a variety of
contexts that are subject to only minimal criminal law regulation, such as lying,
breaking a promise, acting discourteously, or offending another’s sensibilities.
Consider this example. Suppose a co-worker causes you emotional harm (a
type of harm that is only rarely addressed in the criminal law unless accompa-
nied by risks of physical harm). In judging how blameworthy he is for bring-
ing about this harm, the hierarchy of purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence is somewhat informative. He is more culpable if he openly ques-
tions your ability in the presence of other workers for the purpose of causing
you emotional distress, than if he knowingly causes such distress as a byprod-
uct of a more legitimate activity (such as writing a critical review of your
work). Even if he was not justified in the latter case (e.g. because he really has
very little knowledge of the quality of your work), he is less culpable for caus-
ing you emotional harm knowingly rather than purposely. And if he was
merely reckless as to causing you emotional harm, this will ordinarily be less
culpable—unless he also displayed some form of culpable indifference that ele-
vates his recklessness to a culpability level comparable to knowledge. For
example, it is merely reckless to write a negative job evaluation when one is
insufficient familiar with the person’s work and recognizes that the person
might find the review upsetting. However, it is more culpable to do so for an
improper motive—for example, because another co-worker bribed you to write
your (honest) evaluation when you were otherwise disinclined to do so.
But the scope of deserved moral blame is much wider than the scope of
deserved blame for purposes of criminal punishment, quite apart from the types
of acts that are properly understood as wrongful in each domain, and it is
wider in two very different ways. First, the point of examining desert for pur-
poses of punishment is to identify the legitimate preconditions of rendering the
wrongdoer liable to state coercion; and the forms of coercion are potentially
quite severe. But in private blaming contexts, a separate, important reason for
examining the desert basis exists—namely, to consider how the wrongdoer
should respond to the wrong he has already committed. Perhaps he should
apologize to the victim. Or compensate him. Or accept responsibility by resolv-
ing to improve his character in the future. The kind of response that morality
requires or supports here is quite sensitive to the desert basis, and the hierarchy
of culpability will often be relevant.48
48But a response can of course be morally required even if the original action triggering the duty
to respond is not a moral wrong. If I faultlessly run over your dog, I should apologize. And if,
without any fault, I bump you into the path of a speeding bicycle, I should try to save you from
further injury, even at some risk to my own safety.
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Second—and here the distinction from criminal law is even more stark—we
are often justified in blaming someone simply for his vicious attitudes, whether
or not those attitudes played a causal role in bringing about a wrongful act or
harm. If my child takes delight in another’s suffering, or lacks remorse for a
wrongful (or even a nonwrongful) act, or hopes that another will suffer harm, I
would rightly reproach him. If someone commits a serious crime but immedi-
ately thereafter returns to his ordinary life, calmly munching a sandwich,49 or
joining friends for dinner, or interacting with others as if nothing had hap-
pened, the popular reaction will be swift and severe: the actor is especially
blameworthy because of his callousness and shamelessness.50 That reaction is
perfectly justifiable. Of course, such blameworthiness is categorically distinct
from being blameworthy for a culpable state of mind that is appropriately con-
nected to engaging in a wrongful action. Only the latter is directly relevant to
deserved criminal punishment.
Indeed, the moral culpability that an actor displays in a harmful or wrongful
act sometimes pales into insignificance as compared to the moral culpability he
displays by his malicious or callous response to the first wrong. Suppose my
son, rushing off to high school in his car, accidentally runs over the neighbor’s
cat. He finds the mangled body strangely amusing and posts it on Facebook
for the world to see. I would (rightly) reproach him much more severely for
his insensitive reaction to the first wrong than for the wrong itself.
The first-order vice of callous indifference and the second-order vice of
shamelessness are legitimate bases for blame, resentment, and similar reactive
attitudes. These vices are characteristically displayed in wrongful acts, and we
usually only become aware that someone possesses such traits through his
actions and statements. But in principle it seems that an actor could be indiffer-
ent without that attitude playing any role in his primary conduct. Perhaps an
agent who is in a permanent state of complete emotional detachment from his
conduct and choices and from their effect on others could nevertheless act in
perfect accord with his moral duties. Virtue ethics and deontological ethics
may have radically different domains.
VI. Conclusion
When we punish and blame for wrongful acts, we should look beyond the cog-
nitive dimensions of the actor’s culpability and should consider affective and
volitional dimensions as well, including the actor’s intentions, motives, and
attitudes. But we must proceed carefully when permitting criminal liability to
49Consider Robert Alton Harris, who gratuitously killled two teenagers in the course of stealing
their car to commit a bank robbery; after the killing, he ate their unfinished lunch. Pillsbury, Judg-
ing Evil, 118.
50See Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, 95, noting that ‘shamelessness’ is a second-order vice, involv-
ing indifference to his own evil act, a vice Hurka characterizes as less serious than moral depravity,
which is a delight in the moral evil that one has committed.
Culpable Indifference 165
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [7
6.2
4.9
8.1
80
] a
t 0
5:4
2 2
5 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
15
 
turn on such attitudes as culpable indifference, lest we punish vicious or unvir-
tuous feelings that are not sufficiently connected to wrongful acts, and lest we
punish disproportionately for attitudes that reflect only a very modest degree of
culpability.
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